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In this paper we highlight aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign 
tied aid and the welfare state. We model migration as a costly movement from an aid-
recipient developing country with low income, poor infrastructure, and no welfare system, 
towards a rich donor, developed country with a well-developed welfare system.  Within this 
model we find, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is 
to increase aid as the co-financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the 
immigration cost decreases, e.g. due to greater economic integration between the two 
countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid. 
JEL Code: F22, F35, H23. 
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  In recent years there is a surge of migration from Eastern European and other 
countries towards the developed countries and the countries of the European Union in 
particular, despite the efforts of most host countries to restrict immigration, especially 
that of the low skilled labor. From 1992 to 2001 immigration rates in the EU were the 
highest in the world. According to Wildasin (2004), more than one million people per-
year have been arriving to the EU from points of origin beyond its geographic 
boundaries, amounting to a cumulative inflow of over 13 million immigrants over that 
period. Countries, traditionally hosts of immigrants, eg., Germany, experienced a 
resurgent of immigration, while others, traditionally emigration countries, eg., Spain 
and Ireland experienced a strong immigration turnaround. On the other hand, at the 
recent enlargement of the EU (ie., 1.5.2004) the original 15 union members adopted 
various restrictions on free labor movements between them and the accession 
countries for a transitional time period.
1 EU countries are concerned that due to the 
large differences in workers income, huge migration will occur and this could create 
problems in their labor markets and endanger their social welfare system. 
Governments in advanced societies impose income and other taxes to finance the 
provision of public goods and inputs and make transfers in money and or in kind to 
their citizens. Thus, the governments with their welfare systems transfer incomes from 
the relatively more to their less affluent citizens, amongst which are the immigrants. 
In particular, regarding fiscal transfers to this latter group, in a recent public policy 
forum,
2 Wildasin (2004) notes, among other things, that in Germany, Sweden and 
Denmark where immigrants account for approximately 10 percent of the total 
population, they are recipients of over 30 percent of total cash welfare expenditures. 
In addition, Sinn (2004, p. 6) analyzing recent immigration flows into Germany states 
that: “…Migration of workers has been a direct migration into the welfare state 
because the migrants have less than average productivity, earn less than average 
wages and are therefore beneficiaries of the redistributive activities of the welfare 
state. They pay taxes and contributions but receive more public resources from the 
state than they pay for. According to a study by the Ifo Institute, in 1997 the average 
                                                 
1 With the exception of two small countries, Cyprus and Malta. 
2 The CES-ifo and BMW Foundation Herbet Quandt Munich Economic Summit on “Social Union, 
Migration and the Constitution: Integration at Risk”, June 2004.  
  1migrant, who had been in the country for less than ten years, received a gift of about € 
2,400…”   
Considering the above it can be argued that unrestrained influxes of 
immigrants and in particular of low-skilled workers, in host countries may exert 
strong pressures on the social welfare programs designed to protect low-income 
groups.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Standard neoclassical results of the international migration literature state that 
permanent migration is welfare beneficial to the nationals of a host country and 
welfare deteriorating to the non-emigrants of a source country, while marginal 
international labor flows have no welfare effects in either type of countries.
3 These 
results are shown to hold irrespectively of the number of goods or factors, and of 
whether commodity prices are endogenously determined or exogenously fixed (eg., 
see Wong 1985, Quibria 1988).
4     
Recent developments in the literature of international migration within models 
which include income taxes and transfers reveal that immigration of workers, who are 
subject to the same fiscal treatment as natives and are net fiscal beneficiaries, reduces 
the welfare of natives (e.g., Wildasin 1994, Michael 2003).
5 On the other hand, Razin 
and Sadka (2004), in an infinite-horizon, overlapping generations’ economy, show 
that this net welfare loss due to immigration of the low-skilled labour could change to 
net gain to the natives.
6 Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2004), using data for 11 European 
countries found that higher share of low-education immigrants in the population leads 
to a lower tax rate on labor income and less generous transfers. Most developed 
                                                 
3 Migration is permanent in the sense that they do not remit any part of their income earnings back to 
the source country, and that their consumption and utility are part of the host countries welfare. Also 
permanent immigrants are allowed direct access to the host countries public welfare system. Other 
types of international migration considered in the international trade literature are temporary  and cross-
border migration. Kondoh (1999) examines the welfare implications of these types of migration 
patterns on host country welfare.  
4 In the above and other studies of the relevant literature, the welfare beneficial effects of migration for 
the host country rely on the assumption of perfectly competitive product and factor markets. Chao and 
Yu (2002) conclude that in an economy with imperfectly competitive commodity markets, immigration 
of unskilled workers can be welfare deteriorating while that of skilled workers can be welfare 
improving. 
5 See Sandmo and Wildasin (1999), among others, for the welfare implications of immigration and tax 
policies when immigrants are subject to fiscal treatment different than that of native workers. 
6 Epstein and Hillman (2003), in a model with unemployment due to efficiency wages, have shown 
how the presence of unemployed immigrants receiving tax-financed income transfers can be beneficial 
for both national workers and employers.  
  2countries, however, are more willing to accept immigration of high skilled workers 
who, among other things, are net fiscal contributors (see for example Carrington and 
Detragiache 1998 and Bauer and Kunze 2004). 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight aspects related to the links between 
international migration and the welfare state. To achieve this we model migration as a 
costly labor movement from an aid-recipient developing country with low income, 
infrastructure, and a non-existing welfare system, towards a rich donor developed 
country with a well-developed welfare system. The developed country imposes 
income taxes to finance domestic income transfers and aid to the developing country. 
Aid to the developing country is used to finance the provision of a public input. Aid, 
however is tied in the sense that the developing country is required to co-finance the 
public input.
7 Two alternative assumptions are made regarding the objective of the 
donor country. First, we consider the case of an altruistic donor, which chooses the 
amount of aid so that it maximizes the joint, its own and the recipient country’s, level 
of welfare. Second, we consider the case of a self-interested donor, which chooses the 
amount of aid so as to maximize its individual level of welfare.
8 We find, among other 
things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the 
co-financing rate from the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost 
decreases, it is welfare improving for the donor country to increase aid.
9  
 
3. The Model 
We develop a two-country, Home and Foreign, general equilibrium model of 
international migration, foreign aid and of pubic inputs. For the purposes of our 
analysis we let Home be a developed aid-donating labor-importing, host-country, 
while Foreign is assumed to be a developing aid-receiving labor-exporting, source- 
country.   
                                                 
7 In models of international migration where international transfers to the source country are used as a 
migration deterrent mechanism (eg., Myers and Papageorgiou, 2000), aid is lump-lump distributed to 
local residents in order to improve their welfare. For example, EU implements the co-financing policy 
considered here, within its regional policy where countries that get aid are required to finance a certain 
percentage of the cost of the project. 
8 The issue of an altruistic vs. a self-interested donor country is raised, among others and in different 
context, by Lahiri and Raymondos-Møller (1997).  
9 The US has used foreign aid to developing countries, eg., Haiti and Mexico, as means of curbing 
international migration by improving living and working conditions at the origin, rather than by 
adopting costly immigration controls at its borders.  
  3  Other factors of production, such as capital and land, for simplicity, are 
assumed to be internationally immobile, and thus their national supplies are equal to 
their fixed endowments in each country. International trade in goods is free and the 
two countries are small in world commodity markets. As a result, labor flows between 
them do not affect world prices of goods. However, the two countries are large in 
labor markets and labor mobility between them it is not costless.
10
  We assume that each country comprises two classes of identical within each 
class individuals. Capitalists who possess one unit of labor and other factors of 
production, and workers who only possess one unit of labor. We further assume that 
migration between the two countries is from the class of workers and is permanent in 
the sense that immigrants do not remit any of their income earnings back to the source 
country, and that their utility is part of the host country’s welfare.
11 We proceed to 
develop the two-country model of international migration, foreign aid and public 
inputs. Star variables refer to Foreign. 
 Let  NL be Home’s total population, where  H =+ () L and  () H respectively 
denote the number of workers and capitalists in the country. Similarly, 
denotes Foreign’s total population. Because of the assumptions of the 
model   and  . Let 
** NL H =+
*
* dL dL =−
* 0 dH dH == () R L denote Home’s maximum value of 
gross domestic product (GDP), given constant world commodity prices and fixed 
endowments of all other factors. These variables are omitted from the GDP function 
since they do not affect the analysis. The  () R L function is assumed strictly concave in 
L (ie.,  ). 0 LL R <
12 Its partial derivative with respect to L (ie.,  ) is the marginal 
revenue product of labor, which in equilibrium equals the country’s rate of return to 
the factor. 
L R
  We denote by  the minimum expenditure function of a 
representative worker 
( ), ,
jj eu j L H =
() L or of a capitalist () H required to achieve a level of utility 
                                                 
10 This asymmetric treatment of the two countries in world commodity and factor (labor) markets is 
adopted since in the present model the issue is international migration rather than international trade. 
Practically, however, the model could resemble a case of an “old”, pre-accession, EU donor country 
(eg., Germany, France) and of a “new”, post-accession, one (eg., Poland, Slovakia), where both may be 
considered price takers in international goods markets but are affected by their bilateral migration 
flows. 
11 This is an analytical simplifying assumption of the model. Emigrants often do remit part of their 
income earnings back to their home-source country, and source countries do care about the welfare of 
their permanent emigrants. 
12 In a standard two-good two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model it is known that  .  0 LL R =
  4j u given at the constant world commodity prices. Its derivative 
j
u e  denotes the 
reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. Home’s public sector (the government) 
levies income taxes at a rate() ρ . A portion of this tax revenue is assumed to finance 
aid of the amount (  to Foreign, and the remaining portion is equally distributed to 
the country’s residents as transfer payments.
) T
13
  The country’s income-expenditure identity requires that total spending by its 
residents must equal net income from production minus the transfer payment to 
Foreign. That is,  
 
  .                                                                      (1)     () () ( )
LL HH Le u He u R L T += −
 
The income-expenditure identity of a Home’s representative worker requires that 
aggregate expenditure equals net income from labor services plus net transfer 













=− + .                                                                (2)  
 
  In Foreign, production of goods by the private sector, aside of the use of 
primary factors (eg., labor, capital, land), also makes use of a public input ( . For the 
purposes of our analysis it is assumed that the quantity  of the public input is 





14  Then, the government provides , at no cost, to the private sector 
producers for the production of the traded goods.
z
15 Thus, we define 
*** (,) R Lz to be 
Foreign’s GDP function at variable supplies of labor and public input, given the fixed 
endowments of all other primary factors and the constant commodity prices. The latter 
variables, for the reasons previously noted, are omitted from the GDP function. By the 
                                                 
13 It is assumed that all the residents of the country have the same access to the services provided by the 
government such as health, education etc. 
14 There exists a broad international trade literature on local production of public inputs along with the 
production of private goods (eg., Abe 1990, Feehan 1992). Here, and without much loss of generality 
we depart from this standard analytical framework in order to highlight more clearly the results of the 
paper. 
15 Chao and Yu (1999), in a different context, apply the idea of co-financing the purchases of public 
goods through foreign aid and appropriated matching funds by the recipient country. 
  5properties of the GDP function 
** (/ z
* ) R Rz = ∂∂ denotes the marginal revenue product 
of the public input, and is positive and diminishing ( ie.,  **
* 0
zz R < ). It is further 
assumed that labor and the public input are complements in production, that is, an 
increase in the level of the public input   increases the marginal revenue product of 





 Imports  of the public input by Foreign’s government are purchased at a fix 
world price. Moreover, these imports are financed through foreign aid received from 
Home, and by appropriating matching funds,
* z
16 at a rate  0 γ >  (ie.,  T γ ) by Foreign’s 
government to co-finance the purchases of the imported public inputs.
17 These 
matching funds are raised through non-distortionary lump-sum taxes. For simplicity 
we assume that these taxes solely burden the country’s capitalists, while no taxes of 
any type are levied on the class of workers.
18 Assuming that Foreign’s government 
maintains a balanced budget, the public sector’s budget constraint is given by: 
 
 
* (1 ) z p zT γ =+ .                                                                                                (3) 
 
The income-expenditure identity for Foreign requires that total spending by that 
country’s residents must equal income from production minus the lump-sum taxes 
required to finance part of the cost of the imported public input, i.e., T γ . That is, 
 
 
** * * ** * * * () ( ) ( , )
LL H H Le u H e u R L z T γ += −
                                                
.                                                       (4) 
 
Recall that no taxes of any type are levied by the Foreign’s public sector on the class 
of workers neither do they receive any transfer from the government. Thus, the 
income-expenditure identity of a representative worker requires that his aggregate 
spending equals his wage, which equals his marginal revenue product. Thus, 
 
16 In reality, eg., aid in the context of EU regional development policy, co-financing on the part of the 
recipient countries is mandatory for aid to be allotted to them. In our model we assume that the 
recipient country voluntarily contributes, along with foreign aid, to the financing of the public input.  
17 Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001) examine the welfare effects of migration when revenue from 
indirect taxes is used to finance the provision of public goods.  
18 This is a simplifying assumption to facilitate the workings of the model. Actually, however, it is not 
far from reality since the potential immigrants are amongst the poorer groups of the country whose 
income is either about equal or below the minimum taxable income. 
 
  6 
  .                                                                                        (5) 
** *** () ( ,
LL
L eu RL z = )
 
  As previously noted, migration is associated with the class of workers, it is 
permanent and the labor markets equilibrium requires the equalization of the net 
income of the factor in the two countries. It is assumed, however, that migration is not 
costless. That is, immigrants must incur fixed monetary and other costs  in moving 
from one country to the other.
() c
19 Thus, labor market equilibrium is achieved when: 
 
  *
** * (,)( 1 ) L L
RT





= −+ − .                                                                (6) 
 
The left-hand side of equation (6) is the marginal revenue product of labor in Foreign, 
the labor-exporting country. The right-hand side term is the income, net of 
immigration costs earned by an immigrant worker in Home, the labor-importing 
country.
20  
  Equations (1), (2) and (4)-(6) comprise a system of five equations in terms of 
levels of individual welfare (ie.,  ), and level of employment (ie., 
) in the two countries. The policy instruments in our analysis are, for Home, the 
level of foreign aid , and for Foreign the matching rate (
*
,, ,
jj uu j L H =
* () LL
() T ) γ of co-financing the 
purchases of the imported public input . The costs of migration ( constitute an 
exogenous parameter to the model. To pursue the welfare analysis we assume an 
egalitarian social welfare function with weights the reciprocal of  social marginal 
utility of income of each individual in the two countries. Thus, changes in social 
welfare are denoted in Home by 
* () z ) c
L LH
uu dW Le du He du =+
H
*
                                                
, and in Foreign by   
. Differentiating equations (1), (4) and (6) and using 
equations (2), (3) and (5) we obtain: 
** * ** * LL H H
uu dW Le du H e du =+
 
  ,                                                                                          (7)  L dW dL dT =− Λ −
 
19 The immigration cost can be monetary but it can include other costs associated with legal or illegal 
immigration such as cost of moving, settlement, adjustments cost etc. 




























⎡⎤ ++ ⎣⎦ ∆= + +,                                             (9) 
 
where ( ( ) )/ LL R NR T N ρ Λ= − − , [ ( / )] L N ∆ =Φ −Λ  and 
* (1 ) ( 0) LL LL RR ρ Φ =− + <. 
For a representative worker , denoting net transfer payments per worker in Home is 
positive implying that the representative worker is a net fiscal beneficiary. That is, a 
worker receives (
L Λ
) / R TN ρ −  transfer payments that exceed the amount of income 
taxes L R ρ  that he pays. By the properties of the GDP function and the above 
assumption regarding ,  is negative.  L Λ ∆
  Equation (7) captures the standard direct worsening effect of foreign aid on the 
donor country’s (Home) welfare. Also, an increase in the local labor force, due to 
migration, exerts a negative impact on Home’s welfare since it is assumed that 
workers are net fiscal beneficiaries (ie.,  L Λ  is positive). Equation (8) indicates that if 






21 then an increase in the rate () γ or in the amount of aid ( , which 
both raise total funds available for public input spending, raises welfare in Foreign, 
the aid receiving country.
) T
22 Finally, equation (9) captures the effects on Home’s labor 
supply, due to migration, from changes in the policy variables and the cost of 
migration. It indicates that Home’s labor supply falls either with an increase in the 
costs of migration   and/or with an increase in Foreign’s matching funds rate () c () γ . 
Intuitively, an increase in the rate () γ raises purchases of  which in turn raises the 
marginal revenue product of labor, and thus the equilibrium wage rate, in Foreign. 
This increase in Foreign’s wage rate reduces the number of emigrants from Foreign or 
causes return migration from Home to Foreign. In either case, the higher (
* z
) γ reduces 
Home’s labor supply. An increase in the amount of aid entails a negative impact on 
                                                                                                                                            
20 By and large, the literature on international migration perceives legal migration as costless and only 
illegal immigrants bearing a cost of gaining entry to the host country. 
21 We say that if  *
*
z R () >< z p , then there is under-(over) provision of the public input. 
22 Note that because of the income-expenditure specification for Foreign’s workers, as stated by 
equation (5), changes in the country’s labour force (ie., 
* dL dL = − ) do not directly affect its welfare. 
  8Home’s labor supply. On the one hand, higher aid to Foreign exerts a negative impact 
on the donor country’s labor supply since it lowers domestic workers net income 
earnings by decreasing the net income transfers. On the other hand, as in the case of a 
higher matching rate() γ , an increase in the amount of aid reduces Home’s labor 
supply since it increases wages in the Foreign, given that labor and the public input 
are complements in Foreign’s production.   
 
4. Aid, International Migration and Welfare 
In this section, we derive the effects on each country’s welfare from changes 
in the policy instruments or the exogenous variable. Substituting equation (9) into (7) 
and using equation (8), changes in Home and Foreign’s welfare due to changes in the 
variables T, c and γ, accounting for migration induced changes in labor supplies, are 
given as follows: 
 
  T dW A dT A d A dc γ c γ ∆= + + ,  and                                                                 (10) 
 
*
T dW B dT B d γ γ ∆= + ,                                                                                  (11)   
 
where,  ,  **
1* ()[( 1 ) Tz L z Lz Ap N pN R γ
− =−∆− Λ + + ] **
1*
zL Lz A pT R γ
− =− Λ ,  , 
,  , and  
cL A =−Λ
**
1* * [( ) ] Tz z zz BpR Rp γ
− =∆+ − *
1* () zz z BpRp T γ
− =∆ − 0 c B = . 
  Equation (10) depicts the effects of changes in the policy instruments  , T γ  and 
in the migration cost parameter  on Home’s welfare. The term  c
1
T A
− ∆  indicates that 
more aid to Foreign exerts a direct negative effect, and an indirect, labor supply, effect 
on the Home welfare.
23 As we have seen, labor supply in Home falls as a result of aid, 
and thus aid may result to the so-called “transfer paradox” whereby it may improve 
Home’s, the donor country, welfare if the indirect labor supply effects dominates the 
direct negative effect of aid. The term
1A γ
− ∆ indicates that an increase in the matching 
rate of aid() γ , increases employment in the Foreign since labor and the public input 
are complements in Foreign’s production, reduces immigration in Home and thus 
increases its welfare, since immigrants are net fiscal beneficiaries. 
                                                 
d T
23 Note that combining equations (9) and (10) we can write (1 ( / )) TL Ad L = −∆ +Λ . 
  9Finally, a decrease in the cost of immigration unambiguously decreases Home’s, the 
labor-importing country’s, welfare since it causes inflow of net fiscal beneficiary 
workers. Equation (11) captures the effects of changes in  , T γ  and  on Foreign’s 
welfare. Specifically, if there is under provision of the public input, then more aid or a 
higher matching rate (
c
) γ raises Foreign’s welfare. 
 
4.1 Altruistic Donor 
  In this subsection we assume that Home, the donor country, chooses the 
amount of aid ( so as to maximize the joint, ie., its own and the recipient Foreign’s 





** (1 ) ( ) ( )[(1 )( ) ] zz L zL
dW dW
Np N R p T NR R p
dT dT
γρ λ γ Τ
⎛⎞




z z z γ
(12) 
where / TT N = , and  ( / ) LL R NR λ =− , which is positive since average income is 
higher than the wage rate. Setting 0 T Ω = , the optimal level of aid (  maximizing 






















++ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
N ⎥ .                                                   (13) 
 
The denominator of the right hand side term of equation (13) is always positive if the 
marginal revenue product of the public input is equal or greater than its unit cost 
(i.e.,
*
Z z R p ≥ ) (sufficient but not necessary condition). The numerator of the same 
term is not negative if
*
Z z R p ≥ .  If the recipient country choose γ optimally to 
maximize its own welfare, equation (11) reveals that the recipient will chose γ  in 
such a way in order to equalize the marginal revenue product of the public input with 
its marginal cost  (i.e., 
*
zz R p = ).  Thus, when the recipient country choose γ  to 
maximize its own welfare, then the optimum amount of aid chosen by the donor 
country to maximize the joint welfare is positive and is given as  L TN ρ λ Ω = .  If, 
however, the recipient country for some reasons cannot choose γ optimally and it is 
  10sub-optimally chosen, then
*
zz R p > .  In this case, the second term on the right hand 
side of equation (13) is positive, and thus,  ceteris paribus, the amount of aid 
maximizing the two countries joint welfare is greater when the recipient country 




zz R p = , and the donor country gives aid T, the welfare 
of the recipient country increases by T and the donor’s decreases by T, which cancel 
each other. There is, however, an additional indirect effect via the increase in 
employment in the recipient country and thus a decrease in immigration in the donor 
country.  Since immigrants are net fiscal beneficiaries, the reduction in immigration in 
the donor country increases its welfare by L N ρ λ . The optimum amount of aid equals 
the gain in its welfare due to the reduction in the immigration.
25 When the public 
input is sub optimally provided in the recipient country, then there is an additional 
positive effect on the welfare of the recipient country, since it finances the public 
input with aid and the marginal revenue product of the public input is greater than its 
marginal cost, i.e., 
*
zz R p > .      
 
4.2 The Nash equilibrium 
We now examine the choice of the instruments by the two countries, assuming 
that they behave non-cooperatively (Nash). Namely, we assume that Home, the donor 
labor-importing country decides on the amount of aid , and Foreign, the recipient 
labor-exporting country, chooses the matching rate 
() T
() γ to foreign aid. For this, the 
first order conditions are given by:  
 
  , and                                                                             (14)  (/ )
T dW dT A ∆= 0 =
0 =
                                                
  .                                                                                   (15)   
* (/ ) dW d Bγ γ ∆=
 
 
24 Note that the recipient country never chooses γ in such a way so that the public input is over-
provided (i.e., 
*
zz R p < ). If it does so, then by reducing γ  and thus the amount spend for public input, 
welfare increases and it will continue to increase until
*
zz R p = .   
 
25 In this case substituting T  into the migration equilibrium condition, equation (6), it reduces to  Ω
*
*
L L R Rc =− . 
  11Equations (14) and (15) simultaneously determine the Nash equilibrium values of 
and( () T ) γ . In particular, from equation (15) we get that, given that the co-financing 
of aid by Foreign, is used to finance the purchases of the public input, the Nash 
equilibrium value of () γ  requires that *
*
z z Rp = . That is, the Nash equilibrium value of 
() γ leads to the provision of   up to the point where its marginal revenue product is 
equal to its fixed world price. From equation (14) we obtain Home’s, the donor 


















N ⎥ .                                                                            (16)  
 
Equation (16) indicates that the Nash equilibrium value of   can be positive or 
zero.
() T
26 However, the likelihood for it to be positive increases with (i) the value of 
Foreign’s co-financing rate () γ , (ii) the higher degree of complementarity between 
labor and the public input in Foreign’s production (i.e.,, 
**
*
L z R ),  (iii) the difference 
between the average income and the marginal revenue product of labor in Home, ie., 
L λ ,  and (iv) the Home’s income tax rate ρ . Observing equations (13) and (16) it is 
easily verifiable, since , that( *
*
z z Rp ≥ ) TT Ω 0 − > . That is, the amount of aid chosen to 
maximize the countries joint welfare is greater to its Nash equilibrium level. 
  
4.3 Aid, co-financing and the immigration cost. 
Having obtained the Nash equilibrium values of the policy instruments   and () T () γ , 
we examined how changes in the immigration cost affect the above Nash equilibrium 
values. Differentiating the best response or the reaction functions (14) and (15) we 
obtain: 
 
  TT T Tc A dT A d A dc γ γ += − ,    and                                                                     (17) 
  Tc B dT B d B dc γγ γ γ γ += − .                                                                               (18)  
 
                                                 
26 The two right-hand side terms of equation (16) are of opposite sign. The amount of aid, however, can 
only be non-negative. 
  12The expressions and signs of the coefficients in the above equations are given in the 
Appendix. 
  First, equations (17) and (18) can give the slope of each country’s best 























.                                         (19) 
 
Both expressions are of positive sign, i.e., both best response functions have positive 
slope, given the signs of the right-hand side terms as stated in section (B.1) of the 
Appendix. That is, when Foreign raises its co-financing rate γ  the best response for 
Home is to increase the amount of foreign aid. Likewise, the best response for 
Foreign, when Home raises the amount of aid, is to increase its co-financing rateγ . 
Moreover, invoking the stability condition of equations (A.2) of the Appendix, 
requiring that , then 0 Ω> () ( ) // TT T T A AB B γγ γ −> − γ .  
Second, using equations (A.3) and (A.4) of the Appendix, the effect of an 
increase in the migration cost ( on the Nash equilibrium values of policy parameters 
and 
) c
() T () γ  is given as follows: 
 
() ** * *
2 2* * * (1 ) ( ) 0 LL L L Lz z z Lz
dT
NR T R NR NR
dc
γρ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ Ω∆ = − + ∆ +Λ + Λ < ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠
, and             (20) 
 
() ** * * *
2* * * ( 1) ( 1) ( ) 1 ( 1) LL L L Lz z z Lz Lz
d
NR R NR R NR
dc
γ
γγ ρ γ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ Ω∆ = + + +Λ − Λ + + < ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠
* 0 .  
                                                                                                                                   (21) 
 
Equations (20) and (21) indicate that a decrease in the immigration cost 
unambiguously increases the Nash equilibrium amount  of aid by Home, and 
Foreign’s matching rate to foreign aid(
() c () T
) γ
27. Intuitively, the reduction in the 
immigration cost causes an inflow of net fiscal beneficiary foreign workers which 
                                                 
27 An explanation for the positive sign of the term  L LL NR ρ Λ +  is provided by equation (A.1) in the 
Appendix. 
  13decreases Home welfare (i.e., the welfare of natives). Thus, Home has an incentive 
and it is beneficial for itself to provide more aid to Foreign in order to reduce 
immigration. When immigration costs rises, immigration falls and there is no 
incentive to provide more aid. In fact the same effect, ie., fewer immigrants, may be 
achieved with lower aid. Thus, if for some reason (e.g., due to greater economic 
integration), immigration cost is reduced, causing immigration, then it is beneficial for 
the Home, the donor, to provide more aid that in turn again reduces immigration. 
28 
An increase in the immigration cost does not affect the welfare of the recipient 
country directly, but only indirectly, through the change in the behavior of the donor 
country. Thus, the reduction in the immigration cost, which causes the increase in aid 
by the donor, creates an incentive for the recipient country to increase the co-
financing rate γ  since this increase will increase even further the amount of aid.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
As it is well known, there are large differences in wages and government income 
transfers through the welfare system, between developed and developing countries. 
The recent technological and other developments and the globalization, on the one 
hand, have made people in the developing countries more aware of these 
discrepancies and on the other hand, have reduced the cost of migration (legal or 
illegal). As a consequence of the above, a large number of people from the developing 
countries are willing to migrate in the developed countries. The developed, host 
countries, however, are reluctant to accept large numbers of immigrants, especially 
with low skills. They are afraid that large number of immigrants will affect negatively 
their local labor markets and endanger their social welfare systems since the low 
skilled immigrant are expected to be net fiscal beneficiaries. 
  This paper builds a model that takes into account the above features. That is, 
we build a two-country model where migration is modeled from a developing-source 
country with no welfare system to a developed-host country with a comprehensive 
welfare system of income taxes and transfers from its more to its less affluent 
residents. Labor mobility between the two countries is not costless due to the 
existence of migration costs, and the developed country gives aid to the developing 
                                                 
28 Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) in a model with illegal immigration have shown that when illegal 
immigrants have access to the public sector welfare system, then as the border control becomes more 
expensive some migration is permitted and foreign aid may be used to reduce migration pressure. 
  14country. This aid, along with local co-financing, by the developing country is used for 
the provision of a public input, which positively affects the marginal revenue product 
of labor. We consider the cases where aid by the donor country is chosen either in 
order to maximize the joint, its own and the recipient country’s, welfare or in a non-
cooperative (Nash) way. 
  We demonstrate, among other things, that, first, the amount of aid maximizing 
the two countries joint welfare is greater when the recipient country chooses the co-
financing rate sub-optimally compared to when it is chosen optimally. Second, the 
amount of aid chosen to maximize the countries joint welfare is greater than its Nash 
equilibrium level. Moreover,  if there is a reduction in the migration cost due to 
globalization or due to greater economic or political integration, then it is beneficial 
for the donor-host country to increase the Nash equilibrium amount of aid to the 
recipient-source country to co-finance its public infrastructure. For example, it will 
beneficial for the original 15 countries of the EU to increase aid to the new members 
through the EU regional policy or for the USA and Canada to give tied economic aid 
to Mexico for the co-financing of improvements in its infrastructure.
29
       
                                                 
29 Another example is that of regional development transfers between two regions of the same country, 
e.g., former West Germany gives aid to former East Germany to finance the improvement in its 
infrastructure.  
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I. The coefficients in equations (17) and (18) and their signs 
(I.a) The coefficients: Using the first order conditions  0 T A = and  , and when 
differentiating A
0 Bγ =
T=0 we assume that the third derivatives of the revenue function are 
zero,  we obtain: 
**
12 * * (1 ) [ (1 ) ] 0 TT z LL z Lz Lz Ap N R R p N R ργ γ
−− =∆ + + + > , 
2
*
1* 2 (1 ) [ ( )] 0 TL L Lz AN R N T N R γ γρ
− =∆ + Λ + Λ + < L L
Tz z z z z Lz Lz Bp R p N R p R γ γ
− =∆ + ∆ − − >
2
** *




1* (1 ) ( ) 0 Tc z L LL Lz Ap N R N R γρ
− =∆ + Λ + < , 
2
** * *
1* * 2 * () [ ( 1) ( ) ] 0 , = ∆∆ − <
0
,    
*
1* () cz Lz Bp N R γ
− =−∆ > . 
 
(I.b) The signs of the coefficients: 
(i)  TT A and  Bγγ are signed based on the welfare maximization problem of each 
country. Namely, Home chooses  and Foreign chooses () T () γ , non-cooperatively, 
so that social welfare is maximized. Following suitable calculations this implies 
that for Home  must be negative, and for Foreign 
22 1 (/ ) TT dW d T A
− =∆
2* 2 (/ ) dW d T B γγ γ = must be negative. For these results the necessary condition is 
that  and , respectively.  0 TT A > 0 B
γγ <
(ii) The sign of the expression  T A γ and of 
Tc A is determined by the sign of the 
right-hand side term( L NR ) L L ρ Λ+ . Based on the assumptions of the model, the 
latter term is signed as follows: 







Γ= − be the net fiscal benefit accruing to a representative 
worker in Home, the host country. Differentiating this expression with respect to 
() L captures the migration induced change in this per-capita net fiscal benefit. 
That is: 
 
  () L L
dd R T




Γ− ⎛⎞ =− = − Λ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.                                             (A.1) 
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Assuming that (/ is negative, ie., the net fiscal benefit of a worker in Home 




L NR ρ Λ + is positive. 
Based on this,  T A γ  and   are of negative sign.  Tc A
(iii) The coefficient  T Bγ is signed as follows: Equations (17) and (18) in a matrix 
form are given as: 
 







γγ γ γ γ
− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎡⎤





where the determinant of the matrix of the coefficients of  and  dT dγ is 
TT T T A BA B γγγ Ω= − γ . Stability requires that Ω is positive. Given the signs of 
, TT T A A γ andBγγ , the necessary condition for  0 Ω > is that .  0 T Bγ >




II. The effects of changes in  on  and () c () T () γ : 
Equations (A.1) yield the following results: 





⎛⎞ Ω= −+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
,   and                                                               (A.3) 





γ ⎛⎞ Ω= −+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.                                                                        (A.4) 
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